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TRANSITIV E PER MUTATION GROU PS AND EQUIPOT ENT V OTING RU LES* 
Edward W. Packel 
I. Introduction 
The connection between two-alternative voting rules and per-
mutation groups has been fruitfully explored by Bartoszynski [l]. 
Given a voting rule F, defined on a set N of voters, its associated 
permutation group GF on N may contain structurally revealin
g information
about F. T he best known example of this occurs when GF is the
 full
group of permutations on N, in which case F is said to be anonymous. 
T his anonymity condition is generally accepted in social choice theory 
as a statement of fairness or equal power among the voters. 
In this paper we propose a more general notion of fairness, 
called equipotency, by means of the condition that GF be a transitive
permutation group. After presenting a streamlined general development
of the "committee decomposition" results given in [l], we prove that 
transitivity of GF is a sufficient condition for equal distribution of
"power" in a voting rule. T his strengthens and considerably simplifies 
a result proved in [l], while suggesting that this transitivity is an 
important way of axiomatizing fairness among voters. After further 
strengthening the connection between transitivity and equal power by 
looking at simple games, we consider the class of equipotent voting 
*T he author is indebted to John A. Ferejohn for suggesting several ideas
fundamental to the evolution of this paper.
rules. We show by example that if the anonymity condition! i� May' s 
2 
characterization [2] of simple majority rule is replaced by 
then additional voting rules are possible. Finally, with bh
quipotency, 
aid of 
a new and natural social choice condition, we obtain a new! ctiaracter-
ization of simple majority 
anonymity. T he reader who 
rule based on equipotency rather 
is primarily interested in thesl 
han 
atter 
results may proceed directly to the penultimate section ofl t�e paper 
after absorbing the definition of a transitive permutation! g�oup. 
II. Notation and Group T heoretic Preliminaries 
Let N = {1,2, . . •  ,n} be a set of voters attempting to choose 
between the two alternatives in the set X = {x,y}. For cJnvenience 
I 
we use the set C = {-1,0,1} to denote, respectively, 11pre1erence for 
y over x," "indifference," and "preference for x over y." T en a 
profile of voter preferences is simply an n-tuple d = (d1,d2r. ... ,dn) E C
n
and a voting rule or social choice function is a function lF: bn + C.
For convenience we shall assume, unless otherwise !stated, 
that F is dual, by which we mean that F (-d) = -F (d) V d El c·1. Duality 
requires that the alternatives x and y be treated symmetric�lly by 
the voting rule. Imposing duality is not, for our purposls,I a serious
loss of generality since without it we could study separabellv the
structure of the "l" (x over y) and 11-1" (y over x) vote. 
A permutation group G on N is a set of bijections bn N which 
-
contains the identity permutation, contains the inverse of e�ch of 
 
its members, and is closed under composition. Given g E G apd i EN, 
we let ig denote the image of i under g (composition will l bel performed 
3 
from left to right). When convenient we shall also use cycle notation 
for permutations whereby, for example, (123) denotes the permutation 
which maps 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and 3 to 1, leaving all other elements 
fixed. We use (1) to denote the identity permutation. T he group of 
all permutations on a set S will be denoted by T (S). 
Given g £ T (N) and d = (d1,d2, • . .  ,dn) £e
n, let dg £e
n
be defined by d = (d1 ,d2 , • . •  ,d ). Thus d perm
utes the preferences ofg g g ng g 
the voters in accordance with the way g permutes the voters them­
selves.1 T o  each (dual) voting rule F:en + e we associate the permu-
tation group
_
GF on N as follows:
GF {g £ T(N) I F (d )g F (d) v d s e
n}.
T he following example should prove useful in clarifying ideas which 
have been and will be presented in general form. 
Example O: Let F:e9 +e be the voting rule defined verbably as follows.
T he voter set N 
= {1,2, ... ,9} is partitioned into three "committees" 
denoted by N1 (1) = {1,2,3}, N2(1) = {4,5,6}, and N3(1) = {7,8,9}
(the parenthetical "l" indicates that higher level "committees" may 
be forthcoming). Each of these subsets operates under simple majority 
rule to determine its preference, after which a three member "committee 
of committees" N (l) = {N1 (1), N2 (1), N3 (1)} is formed to reach a
final decision, again by simple majority rule. It can be checked 
that for this rule F, the group GF can be described by
GF = {g £ T (n) I V i = 1,2,3, g maps N. (1) onto some N. (l)l(j i J 
T hus, (123) (4859) (67) £ G , but (14) (25) (789) t G . 
Having �de Che cnnne�'inn be,ween vn,ing rulea � 
tation groups, we now present some general permutation grolp
that will be needed for later application. We refer the rla 
[3] for fuller exposition. 
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1,2,3)}. 
permu-
results 
er to 
Let G be a permutation group on N. T he following definition 
is central to the results that follow. 
Definition: G is transitive if V i, j E N, a g £ G such thal' ig 
By way nf illua,ra,inn, '' can be checked 'ha' GF fnr Exa�l O ia
transitive; but that if one the committees, say N3 (1), opelatted under
absolute majority rule, the resultant group GF would no lolger be
. 2 J· 
transitive (there would, for instance, be no g £ GF with lg 7). 
We now describe how a permutation group G can be l uJed to
decompose the underlying set N into independent "blocks" in natural 
algebraic fashion. If G 
= GF for some voting rule F then, I a� developed
in [1], these blocks can be thought of as "committees" whose 
will be aggregated to eventually determine a final outcomel 
be helpful to keep this interprelation (and Example 0) in ii I preceed, but we carry out our current development for an arb 
permutation group G on N. 
decisions 
It may 
d as we 
trary 
For any i, j £ N, let g . .  E T(N) denote the perinudation that iJ 
interchanges i and j and leaves everything else fixed. Itl i� easy to 
check that the relation - on N defined by i - j < > g .. t G is an iJ 
5 
equivalence relation (for the transitivity of - , note that 
g.k = g . .  g.kg . .  ). T hus N is partitioned under - into dis
joint equiva-
i l.
J J 
l.
J nl lence sets {N. (l)} . 1•l. i= 
It is easy to check that for any g E G and any Ni (l) with
12_i2_ n1, the image of Ni (l) under g is Nk (l) for some 1 .::_ k .::_ n1
(every "block" either maps onto itself or onto some other block). 
Ill the language of permutation group theory, the {N.(l)}. 1 are calledl. i=
In 
sets of imprimitivity for G. T o  formalize this idea of permutation of 
blocks, let N (l) = {l,2, •. . ,n1} and define, for each g E
 G, a permutation
g E T (N (l)) according to ig = k < > (Ni(l))g = Nk (l). We then obta
in
a permutation group on N (l) defined by 
- - 3 G (l) = {g E T (N (l)) I g E G}. 
In the case where G = GF, the group 
G (l) can be thought of as the set
of permutations among the committees remaining invariant under F. 
We can now apply the same construction to G (l) that was 
n
applied to G, first partitioning N (l) into sets {N.(2)}.
2
1 by means ofl. i=
the equivalence relation on N (l) induced by transpositions g . .  E G(l) l.
J and then obtaining a permutation group G(2) on N (2) = {l,2, . •• ,n2}.
We continue the process until we reach a stage r where nr = nr+l
(the equivalence sets are all singletons), at which point we stop 
since no additional decomposition can occur. T he group G = G (r) is 
then a permutation group on N (r) = {1,2, . . .  ,nr} and we call it the
imprimitive residue of G. In Example 0, it can be checked that 
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N (l) = {1,2,3}, GF(l) = T (N (l)), N (2) = {l}, and � (2) =Gt is the
trivial permutation group on one element. T he following l�lllililii will be 
useful in the next section. lLemma 1. A permutation group G is transitive <=> its imprimi1 ive 
residue G is transitive. 
Proof. By the nature of our definition of G, it suffices tlo show that 
G is transitive <=> G(l) is transitive. Assuming G is tralsi�ive, 
consider any two equivalence sets N. (l) and N. (l) C N, andlchbose l. 
J 
-
i1 E Ni (1) and jl E Nj (1). By transitivity of G, there existls g E G
such that i
1
g = j1• It follows directly that for g E G (l) j iJg = j, 
so G (l) is transitive. Conversely, if G (l) is transitive, !consider 
any i,j E N. Let N. (1) and N. (1) be the equivalence sets o 11 31
containing, respectively, i and j. T hen i1 and jl are in N (l
by transitivity of G (l) on N (l), there exists h E G (l) witJ i! 
I 
Choose any g E G with g =h and we must have ig = k EN. (1). 
J1 follows that g' = ggkj E G and ig' = j, so G is transitive.
N 
and 
It 
Q.IE. D. 
III. T ransitivity and Equipotency 
jl.
If individual voters cannot be indifferent between t and y, 
then we obtain the "dichotomous" voting rules considered ij [ ] .
I 
Letting B = {1,-1}, we can view such rules as functions F:Bn � C. 
In 'hia oaae, <he power index of Shapley and Shubik [4] mat � uaed
to measure the relative power pi of each voter i E N. For lthis index 
to be meaningful we require (in addition to duality) two morel social 
choice conditions on F. G c,d E Cn, we write c < d if c. < d. - ]. - ]. 
V i = 1,2, • • .  ,n. Also if k = 0,1,2, . . •  ,n, we let lk denote the
n-tuple in Bn whose first k components are l's with the rest being
-l's. 
Definition: F is monotonic if x .s_ y =;> F(x) .s_ F(y). 
Definition: F is Pareto if F(ln) = 1 and F(-ln) = -1.
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Given F:Bn-+ C monotonic, Pareto, and dual, define for each
g E GF the integer k = [g] as follows:
[g] k <=> F(lk )g 1 and F(l
k-l
g ) f 1.
The well-definedness of [g] follows from monotonicity, Pareto and 
the definition of F. We. can now define the power of voter i by 
p. = 1.- i{g E GF I [g]gl. n. i} 1. 
The "story" behind pi is the now familiar one first described in [4].
Thus pi is the percentage of time voter i will cast the "pivotal" vote
assuming that all permutations of voting orders are equally likely 
and that all voters preceding i vote as i does. 
Theorem 1. If there exists o E GF such that io = j, then p. = p ..]. J 
Proof. Given any g E G and a specific o with io = j, we first show 
that [go] = [g]. Indeed, F(lk ) = 1 <=> F(lkg) = 1 by definition ofgo 
o E GF and we therefore have [go]= [g]. Let Gi = {g E GF I [g]g = i}.
Then g E Gi <=> [g]g = i <=> [go]g = i <=> [go]go = io
so o is a bijection between Gi and G .. Thus p. = I G. IJ ]. ]. 
j <=> go E G., J 
I G. I = p 
. •J J 
Q.E.D. 
By the definition of transitivity, we immediately obtain: 
Theorem 2. Given F:Bn-+ C monotonic, Pareto, and dual. Titen! GF 
transitive=> p. = p. v i,j EN. ]. J 
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Theorem 2 provides considerable motivation for our 
fo�la<ed defini<ioo of an equipo<eo< vo<ing role. Beforf 
added motivation, we note that Theorem 2 along with Lemma 1 
simplifies and strengthens a result obtained in [l]. Therl 
shown that for F as in Theorem 2, sufficient conditions fat 
rsoon to be 
•roviding 
onsiderably
"t was 
i = pj
V i,j E N are: 
i) The imprimitive residue of GF of GF is·either degenerate 
(nr = 1) or cyclic of order nr.
ii) The various equivalence sets Ni (s) satisfy !Ni (s)Jj 
I N.(s)i V 1 < s < r and 1 < i, j < n .J - - - s 
Since condition i) alone implies transitivity (using Lemma I 1)1 it is 
clear that Theorem 2 greatly simplifies the result of [l];larld Theorem 2 
is genuinely stronger if we can exhibt a transitive GF whose -  
imprimitive 
residue GF is neither degenerate nor cyclic. This is providqd by:
Example 1. Le< N ° {1,2,3,4,5,6) and le< <he voring rule l ,J6 + C 
be simple majority rule except that in cases of a 3 to 3 11hiq," 
a): d1 = d2 or d3 = d4 or d5 = d6 => F(d) = O
b): a) inapplicable and !{i I d.= l}n{l,3,S}i odd 'i=>IF(d) = 1 ]. 
c): a) inapplicable and l {i I d. = l} n {1,3,S} I even I=� F(d) = -1.]. 
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It can be checked that F (which is not as frightening as it 
looks) is monotone, Pareto, dual, and has (using cycle notation) 
GF = (Cl),(12)(34),(13)(24),(14)(23),(12)(56),(15)(26),(16)(25),
(34)(56),(35)(46),(36)(45)>, where(-) denotes "the group
generated by." Since GF is clearly transtive and GF = GF, Example 1
achieves its purpose. 
In order to strengthen further the implication from transi-
tivity to equipotency, we make the following observations. While use 
of the Shapley-Shubik index is natural in the context of permutation 
groups, there are various other well-developed measures of power (eg., 
[5] and [6]) defined on simple n-person games and hence applicable to 
F:Bn + C� Without giving details, we note that for a simple game
v:2 N + {O,l} , the group Gv of permutations on N which preserve winning
coalitions can be defined. Any cr e: Gv with icr = j will provide a bijec-
tion between the winning coalitions containing i and those containing j. 
For any "reasonable" power index (including all those referred to 
above) it must then be the case that all players have equal power 
whenever Gv is transitiye.
In [l] an example is given of a voting rule F:Bn + B (and
hence of a simple n-person game) in which players have equal power with 
respect to a variety of power indices, but whose associated permutation 
group is not transitive. Since this example is not dual (its associated 
game v turns out to be improper), a converse to theorem 2 is still 
possible. A weaker result which seems likely is that p. = p. V i,j e: N 1 J 
and condition (ii) above will imply transitivity of GF. The situation
is further complicated by the fact that, for the more general case of 
10 
F:Cn + C, there is to date no satisfactory definition for meaJuring power. If we had such a power index (or a variety of them), t might well be the case that equal powers would imply transitivity o at 
least that no counterexample (common to all indices) would be
Isbell [7] has also considered simple games whose associate� 
evident. 
ermutation 
groups are transitive and he suggestively calls such games l"fair." 
In any event, we have completed our motivational case for d'efring 
a vuUng rule '" be equipu'e°' if i" muci"ed P'-'°'+ r•p 1' 
transitive; and we formally do so in the next section. Even if tran-
sitivity should turn out to be more restrictive than equalJtylof 
individual powers, the results obtained should be of indepeldent 
interest. 
IV. Equipotency and Simple Majority Rule
The important paper by May [2] characterizes a voli*g rule
F:Cn + C as simple majority rule if and only if F is anonymou$, .dual,
and ''r�gly �nu,unio. Anunymi'y mea� 'ha< GF = r( N) (•1 •rY two 
voters can interchange their votes without affecting the oulc me),
duality has already been defined, and F is strongly monotoniclif and 
only if F is monotonic and vc,d e: en,
F(c) 
F(c) 
0 and d > c => F(d) 
0 and c > d => F(d) 
1 
-1.5 
·A major motivation for our paper .was the question of what hip 
May's theorem if anonymity is weakened to the requirement tha
a transitive permutation group. Let F:Cn + C be a not necebs 
dual voting rule throughout this section.
ens in 
GF is
rily 
Definition: F:Cn + C is equipotent if GF is transitive.
Example 2. Let F:c3 + C be defined as simple majority rule except
that 
F(l,-1,0) F(0,1,-1) F(-1,0,1) 1 
and 
F(-1,1,0) = F(0,-1,1) = F(l,0,-1) = -1. 
Then F = {(l), (123), (132)}, a transitive group on N {1,2,3},
so F is equipotent. 
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It is easily checked that the voting rule of Example 2 is 
both dual and strongly monotonic, so weakening anonymity to equipotency 
allows a class of voting rules that properly includes simple majority 
rule. We now propose two social choice conditions which, in conjuction 
with equipotency, will once again characterize simple majority rule. 
Definition: F:Cn + C is stable if V c,d E Cn with c + d E Cn,
F(c) = F(d) => F(c + d) = F(c) 
Definition: F:Cn + C is unanimous if F(ln) 
F(d). 
1, F(-ln) = -1 and F(O) = O.
Stability requires that agreement of F on two profiles implies 
agreement on their algebraic sum, provided this sum remains in Cn. In
particular, agreement on two "disjoint" profiles (their non-indifferent 
members do not overlap) forces agreement on their sum. Also "cancella-
tion" of an oppositely voting individual in the two profiles is also 
permissible (-1 + 1 = 0 EC), but addition of the same non-indifferent 
preferences of an individual is not (1 + 1  = 2 i C). Unanimity says 
that if voters are unanimous in their preference (including "preference" 
for indifference), then the social decision must support this preference. 
12 
Clearly unanimity is implied by Pareto and duality, but we1aue no 
longer assuming duality. 
Theorem 3. F:Cn + C is equipotent, stable, and unanimous �=� F is
simple majority rule. 
Proof. It is easily checked that simple majority rule implies the 
 stated conditions, so we concentrate on the left to right imp[ication. 
For i,j EN with i # j, let di,j denote the d E Cn with di= r.·. 
dj = -1, and all
.
o�her coordinates 0. We first show that l(d�' J ) 
Suppose that F(di'J) = 1, and choose a E GF with iG = j us�nglequi-
potency of F. Let m be the order of a (m is the smallest lpo�itive 
integer for which cf1 = (1)). Since F is invariant under tlie �ction 
-1 of a E GF, we have
1 = F(di,j) = F(di,iO) = F(diG,iG
2
) = • • •  = F(dic
fl-1,t). 
By stability of F we then have 
. ·a2F(di,i ) = 1
. ·a3 F(di,i ) = 1
· ·a2 · ·a ·a ·a2 (since di,i = di,i + di ,i )
. ·a3 . ·a2 ·a2 ·a3 (since di,i = di,i + di ,i )
F(di,ia
111-l
) = 1 (by a straightforward induction arg�meint) • 
. cf!-1 . . . cf!-1
This give us F(di ,i) = F(di,i ) = 1 and hence by stabi�ity, 
. cf!-1 . . . cfl-1F(O) = F(di ,i + di,i ) = 1, which violates unanimity. I Hence 
F(di,j) # 1 and a completely analogous argument using -1 gJve
0. 
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F(di,j) I -1. Thus F(di,j) 0 V i,j c: N with i I j. We now intro-
duce the notation 
l(d) = {i E N d. = l} and -l(d) = {i E N I d. = -1}. 
]_ 1 
We have so far shown that ll(d)I = j -l(d) I = 1 => F(d) = 0. A 
straightforward inductive application of stability then establishes 
ll(d) I = 1-l(d) I => F(d) = O. Now consider d E en with ll(d) I = 1
and 1-l(d) I = 0. Since F is equipotent, F must take the same value on 
all such d. Repeated use of stability and an application of unanimity 
(F(ln) = 1) then requires that F(d) = 1. Similar arguments establish
generally that l(d) I ¢, -l(d) = ¢ => F(d) = 1 and l(d) = ¢, 
-l(d) I ¢ ==> F(d) -1 (thus F has the strong Pareto property). 
Finally, consider d E en with ll(d) I > 1-l(d) I .  Suppose that F(d) = 0
and choose c E en with l(c) = -l(d), -l(c) � l(d), and ll(c) I =  1-l(c) I .
Then F(d) = O, F(c) = 0 (by earlier results), and c + d E en with
l(c+d) I � and -l(c+d) = ¢. Stability requires F(c+d) = 0, contradicting 
the strong Pareto result obtained above. Thus we cannot have F(d) = 0. 
Suppose that F(d) = -1 and choose c E en with l(c) = ¢, -l(c) � l(d),
and l-1 (c) ll(d) I - 1-l(d) I .  Then c + d E en and ll(c+d) I =  1-l(c+d)
so F(c + d) = O. But stability and F(c) F(d) = -1 provide the 
desired contradiction, so we cannot have F(d) -1. It follows that 
ll(d) I > 1-l(d) I => F(d) = 1 and by analogous arguments,. ll(d) I <  1-l(d) I 
=> F(d) = -1. We have shown overall that 
f (d) u if l1<d> I 1-1(d)I if ll(d)I > 1-l(d) I if ll(d) I < 1-l(d) I 
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so F is indeed simple majority rule. 
Q.ELD. 
and 
all 
In <he •piri< of [2] we n� •how <hat equipo<enc1, 0<"1>ility, 
unanimity are independent by exhibiting voting rules whicp satisfy 
combinations of two of these three conditions. ExamplJ 2lgiven 
previously can be seen to be equipotent and unanimous, but ist�bility 
fails since F(l,-1,0) = F(0,1,-1) = 1, but F(l,0,-1) = -1. I For 
another such example where the stability fails at 0 rather lthan at 
1, consider 
Example 3: Let F(n) denote simple majority rule for n votersland let
F:e6 -+ e be the representative system defined by
F(d) (3) (2) (2) (2) ) ) F (F (c1,c2),F (c3,c4),F (c5,c6 • 
It can be checked that F is equipotent and unanimous, but �(l�0,-1,0,0,0) 
F(O,l,0,0,-1,0) = 0 and F(l,1,-1,0,-l,O) = -1, so F is not !stable. 
A simple example which is stable and unanimous, l:lutlnot 
equipotent is provided by 
Example 4: Let F:e2 -+ e be simple majority rule except th�t f(l,-1) 
and F(-1,1) = -1. Th� GF - ((1)) and fail• <o be <r�•i<� 
Finally, we need not work hard to obtain an equippt¢nt, 
stable, but nonunanimous voting rule. 
Example 5: Let F:e -+ e be defined by 
(a) F(l) F(O) 1, F(-1) -1. 
(b) F(d) = 0 V d E e. 
Each of 5(a) and 5(b) is trivially equipotent andl s¢able, 
1 
15 
but fails to be unanimous. Less trivial and more realistic examples 
could also be supplied to establish the independence of equipotency, 
stability, and unanimity. 
V .  Conclusions 
We have taken cues from two important papers in social 
choice theory in what we have done. Bartoszynski's development [l], 
which we have streamlined somewhat, led to results connecting transi-
tivity and equipotency. Consideration of May's Theorem [2] then 
evolved into an alternative characterization of simple majority rule 
in which transitivity (equipotency) plays an important role. The 
results obtained indicate that the condition of permutation group 
transitivity provides a natural and significant statement of individual 
equity in social choice theory (and in game theory). 
Another important aspect of the results in [l] is the de-
composition into a hierarchical committee structure which they provide. 
These results have been viewed as an alternative approach to the 
theory of representative systems as developed in Fishburn [8, chap-
ters 3 and 4]. Since the committees obtained in a group theoretic 
decomposition are disjoint, this approach will succeed only for 
representative systems whose various committees (at all hierarchical 
levels) are disjoint. Thus Example 2 is a representative system 
according to the following structure (recall that F(k) is simple majority
rule with k voters): 
16 
F(d1,d2,d3) F
(3) (F(Z) (d1,F
(Z) (d1,d2)) ,F
(Z) (d2,F
(Z) (d�,dj,)), 
I 
F(2) (d3,F
(2) (d3,dl))).
The group theoretic decomposition for F has each voter bei!nglhis own
connnittee and clearly does not reflect the essential naturl �f this
representative system. 
The stability condition presented here is, to ow: 
new. It does have aspects in common with the consistency �r 
given by Young [9] and Smith [10] in their Borda count chala 
tions. Nonetheless, our characterization of simple majorJty 
appears to be quite different from either May's characterila
what falls out from the Borda count characterizations appl�e
only two alternatives. 
owledge, 
perty 
teriza-
rule 
ion or 
with 
It is hoped that replacing the commonly used anonynjity 
condition with our weaker transitivity condition may lead bo !interesting 
characterizations of other well known voting rules as well l as a clean 
characterization of "fair" representative systems (see [8]). 
We conclude by posing a "backwards" question whilh !might 
h . . l" . . . 1 h . h Gi l ave interesting app ications in socia c oice t eory. lemutation group G on N, what can we say about the collection oJf voting 
rules F:Cn + C such that GF = G and are there group theoreJicl properties
which will force the presence of various well-established Joc�al choice
conditions? 
1. 
2. 
17 
FOOT NOTES 
More precisely, if ig = j, then voter i in the profile dg takes 
the preference of voter ig = j in the profile d. Thus, strictly 
-1speaking, dg permutes d as g E GF permutes N.
Transitivity in the context of permutation groups appears to have 
no direct connection with transitivity of a binary relation. 
Since the terminology is standard, we stay with it with the belief 
that no serious confusion will result. 
3. If we let S denote the homomorphism from G into G(l) defined by
gS = g, we can let G(l) .£_ G be the kernel of S. It follows
directly that G(l) ;; T( N l (1)) @ T ( N2 (1)) @ • • · @ T( N (1) and thatnl 
G/G(l) ;; G(l). Bartoszynski [l] claims that G ;; G(l) ® G(l), 
which is not technically correct, through G is isomorphic to a 
wreath product of G(l) and G(l) when G is a transitive permutation 
group. 
4. Specifically, a voting rule F:Bn + C can be associated with the
simple game v defined as follows.
s Bn I x. = 1 < > i s s}.i 
For SC N, let xs = {(xi, . • •  ,xn)
5. 
Then let 
11 if F(xs) = 1v(S) = 
0 otherwise 
Note that v as defined treats indifference under F as 
vote. Also, v will be proper (v(S) = 1 > v( N\S) = 
dual; v will be nontrivial (v( N) = 1) if F is Pareto; 
be monotone (S � T > v(S) 2. v(T)) if F is monotone. 
By c > d we mean c. > d. for all i and c. > d. for i - i J J 
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